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  Market power of workers on wages is bound to affect economic performances. This 
paper focuses on this issue and analyse the influence of bargaining structures on growth 
and labor market functioning. To achieve this, we construct an endogenous growth model 
where  growth  appears  as  the  result  of  a  learning-by-doing  process  whereas  imperfect 
information  in  the  labor  market  implies  matching  frictions  in  the  hiring  process.  If 
investment occurs before wage bargaining, the growth process can be durably altered. In 
this case, a higher bargaining power of worker does not give a clear-cut effect on growth.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
In most OECD  countries, workers have their wages set by collective bargaining between 
employers and trade unions at the plant, firm, industry or aggregate level. Taking into account 
this established fact, a large literature developed in the eighties to assess the impact of union 
power on labor market functioning, being on the wage formation or on the unemployment rate 
(Nickell  and  Layard  1999,  Booth  2002).  More  generally,  during  this  period  labor  market 
institutions have been the object of an intensive political debate and sometimes seen as the 
cause of the high European rate of unemployment. Even if this explanation must be taken 
with  caution  as  unemployment  in  Europe  highly  diverged  in  the  nineties  (Blanchard  and 
Wolfers 2000), assessing the impact of bargaining procedures is worth examining. 
 
On the other hand, a literature linking unemployment and growth followed Pissarides (1990) 
who introduced growth in a matching model. Whereas the growth process considered was 
exogenous,  it  has  been  made  endogenous  in  Bean  and  Pissarides  (1993)  or  in  Pissarides 
(2000). Nevertheless, these models do not exhibit a clearcut link between unemployment and 
growth. 
 
Our focus is to link these two domains. We will therefore aim to analyse bargaining in a broad 
context and relate this particular way of wage formation with a growth process. Some recent 
articles dealt with this subject. A lower unionization rate would result in higher research and 
development  and  higher  growth  according  to  Peretto  (1998).  Palokangas  (1996, 
2000) introduces bargaining in a Romer type growth model (1990). In this case, a higher 
bargaining  power  would  result  in  a  higher  growth  process  along  the  following 
lines. Assuming that unions protect high qualified workers employment, a higher bargaining 
power  results  in  a  higher  part  of  qualified  workers  employed  and  hence  higher  growth.  
Palokangas (2004) obtains the same kind of results with a growth process based on research 
and development but where the bargaining power is determined by laws and hence by the 
government.  
 
With respect to the preceding articles, we rather consider search models in which trade is 
considered  as  a  decentralised  activity  (Pissarides  2000,  Cahuc  2001).  In  this  framework 
unemployment and vacancies coexist due to imperfect information. Bargaining power is then 
considered at the worker level and we will consider its impact on the capital stock and on the 
growth process. Two bargaining games will be considered in turn: one in which firms and 
bargaining  appear  independent  and  one  in  which  there  is  a  hold-up  problem.  Indeed, 
following Grossman and Hart (1986) and Grout (1986), we consider in this latter game that 
firms have do decide investment before bargaining occurs. An increased bargaining power of 
workers therefore decreases firms’ incentives to invest. Regarding growth, we adopt a Romer-
style endogenous growth model. A production externality implying non decreasing returns to 
capital allows an endogenous growth process.  
 
After a presentation of the basic framework, we develop two models of bargaining which will 
be compared and analysed in a latter section.  
 
1.  The basic framework 
 
In this section, we describe the basic framework we will be working with. The structure of the 
model  is  based  on  Pissarides  (2000)  but  introduces  an  investment  externality  in  the  firm 
technology to allow endogenous growth. There are two broad categories of agents, firms and   3
workers,  and  time  is  continuous.  The  first  subsection  handles  the  labor  market,  a  second 
firm’s  behaviour  whereas  the  third  one  deals  with  consumer  behaviour.  A  last  section 
describes the wage bargain. 
 
     Search in the labor market 
 
In all industrialized countries, mobility of the workforce is high. Workers evolve continuously 
between  different  states  (employment,  unemployment,  inactivity)  as  job  creation  and  job 
destruction processes are simultaneous. Hence, in presence of large flows on the labor market, 
it may not be adequate to assume that firms and workers can instantaneously locate each 
other.  We  rather  consider  imperfect  information  in  the  “meeting”  process.  In  this  case, 
unemployment and vacant jobs may coexist and the equilibrium unemployment appears as the 
result of these flows (Hall 1979, Pissarides 1979, 2000).  
 
Job termination is the result of an exogenous shock which affects existing jobs at rate l . This 
shock can be considered either as a demand or a productivity shock which destroys existing 
jobs. We thus stick to the initial hypothesis considered in Pissarides (1990) although this 
hypothesis has been highly discussed and reconsidered when trying to model labor market 
behaviour  (Aghion  and  Howitt,  1994,  Pissarides  2000).  Nevertheless,  this  simplifying 
assumption can be justified as our purpose is not to focus on the labor market functioning. 
Moreover, it has also been made in a context of growth process (Pissarides 2000, Postel-
Vinay, 1998, Moreno-Galbis, 2005).  
 
Job creation depends on the number of vacancies firms decide to offer and on the efficiency 
of the matching process. For tractability reasons, we further assume that there is no on the job 
search neither job-to-job quitting. The hiring decision is the result of a matching function 
depending on the number of unemployed and vacant jobs: 
) , ( ) , ( vL uL m V U m m = =   (1) 
where U  and V denote respectively the number of unemployed and vacant jobs, u  and v the 
rate  of  unemployment  and  vacancies  and  L  is  the  labor  force.  The  matching  function  is 
supposed increasing, concave in both arguments and homogeneous of degree one. This has 
been confirmed by numerous empirical studies in different countries (Layard et al., 1991, 
Feve and Langot, 1996, Berman, 1997). 
 
A firm who decides to offer a vacancy is not sure to fill it. Assuming that firms who become 
successful  are  selected  randomly  from  the  vacancy  pool,  each  vacancy  is  filled  with 
probability  vL vL uL m / ) , ( . As the matching function is homogeneous of degree one, this can 
be rewritten as  ) 1 , / ( ) ( v u m q = q  where  u v/ = q  stands for a measure of the tightness of the 
labor market. Other things being equal, more vacant jobs with respect to unemployment result 
in a lower probability to fill a vacancy ( 0 ) ( ' £ q q ). Only unemployed workers are engaged in 
the matching process and they find a job with probability  uL vL uL m q / ) , ( ) ( = q q . In this latter 
case, the tightness of the labor market plays again on the probability to be successful in a job 
search. Indeed, more vacant jobs with respect to unemployment result in a higher chance for 
unemployed workers to find a job.  
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  Firms and technological progress 
 
Firms are homogeneous and produce a unique good which is either consumed by households 
or  accumulated.  The  production  process  is  represented  by  the  following  Cobb-Douglas 
function increasing with capital and labor in efficiency unit: 
     
) ( ) , (
1 a a - = t t t t t N k AK kN K F   (2) 
 
t K  and  t N are respectively the capital and the employment of the representative firm and  t k  
the aggregate capital labor ratio which improves the efficiency of labor along the Romer 
(1986)  framework.  The  production  function  verifies  the  usual  neoclassical  properties  and 
exhibits constant returns to scale in the accumulated factors which allows unbounded growth. 
The  effect  of  capital  accumulation  is  not  internalised  by  firms  and  is  considered  as  an 
unintended by-product. It is then compatible with the existence of a competitive equilibrium.  
 
Due to matching frictions in the labor market, unemployment and vacant jobs coexist. When 
deriving the critical condition for the supply of jobs, firms take into account that the rate of 
worker  return  is  ) (q q   and  that  they  lose  jobs  at  the  rate  l .  Hence,  employment  in  the 
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Firms decide on investment ( t I ) and on the number of vacant jobs ( t V ) to offer. We suppose 
that capital does not depreciate and that it is hired at the price of output. No adjustment costs 
of capital are considered but costs of adjusting employment. In order to fill their vacancies, 
firms undergo hiring costs (cost of advertising, cost of hiring) which we denote  t g . Finally, 
wage is the object of an individual bargaining between firm and worker. 
 
    Consumers 
 
Whatever the source of their revenues, agents consume a unique good, either consumed or 
invested. At this stage, we namely ignore heterogeneity between agents due to their labor 
market status. This can be justified on the ground that revenues inside families are shared. It is 
also a useful modelling device to avoid a greater complexity of the model (Pissarides 2000). 
 
An infinite-lived representative consumer seeks to maximise the value of its intertemporal 
utility which is assumed increasing, concave and of constant marginal utility. 
Budget constraint or consumer wealth (W ) evolves according to:  R c rW W + - =
.
 . 
It is increasing with the interest rate r  and the revenue R , decreasing in consumption c.     5
 


















r    (4) 
Solving  this  program  gives  the  rate  of  growth  of  consumption  along  the  usual  Keynes-
Ramsey condition:  
[ ] r
n






   (5) 
 The growth rate is higher, the higher the discrepancy between investment return and the rate 
of time preference. It therefore shows the arbitrage agents have to do to split their revenue 
between consumption and savings. All variables playing on the investment return will also 
affect the growth rate of the economy. 
 
   Wage bargain 
 
Wage bargain takes place between the worker and the firm. We therefore move away from the 
collective bargaining problem to consider the impact of the individual bargaining power of 
the  worker.  As  is  commonly  used  in  the  labor  literature,  the  wage  rate  is  therefore  the 
outcome of a Nash bargaining process. Both firms and workers have an incentive to agree on 
a wage rate as they would loose the joint surplus in case of disagreement. 
 
When  employed,  a  worker  earns  the  wage  rate  t w   and  he  is  searching  a  job  when 
unemployed.  When  employed,  the  worker  loses  his  job  with  probability  λ  while  when 
unemployed, his probability to be employed is  ) (q q q . 
 
Let  t E  be the present-discounted value of the expected income of being employed and  t C  the 
same for unemployed. We therefore write:  ) ( t t t t C E w rE - - = l . Interpreting this as asset 
equations, the market value of being employed is then equal to its return consisting in the 
wage perceived diminished by the expected return from being unemployed. The same for 
unemployed is noted:  ) )( ( t t t t C E q z rC - + = q q  with  t z  being the alternative income workers 
get when unemployed. 
 
On the  firms’ side, we  write  t J  the present discounted value of the expected income of 
having a job occupied and  t V  the same for vacant jobs. These two values take the following 
form:  ) ( ' t t t N t V J w F rJ - - - = l  and  ) )( ( t t t t V J q x rV - + - = q . When employed, a 
job yields a return corresponding to its marginal productivity minus its labor cost. This job 
incurs a probability  l  to be destroyed. When vacant, this job is costly ( t x ) but takes a value 
corresponding to its probability to be filled ( ) (q q ). 
 
Due to the existence of matching frictions, a global surplus appears from a successful bargain. 
The outcome of a Nash bargaining game depicts the labor share as a constant share of the 
global surplus created from a successful match: 
) ( ) ( V J C E C E t t t t t - + - = - b    (6)   6
The bargaining power of the worker (b ) is treated as a constant parameter strictly between 0 
and 1. A higher bargaining strength for the worker will then yield him a higher share of the 
global surplus. 
 
Firms  are  free  to  offer  vacancies  and  will  do  so  until  all  the  opportunities  of  profit  are 
exploited ( 0 = V ). Using this condition and the values of  t E ,  t C  and  t J  allow us to write the 
wage bargained as:   [ ] t N t t rC F rC w - + = ' b . Finally, using the Nash bargaining solution so 
as a combination of the asset value equations gives the wage rate as follows: 
[ ] t N t t x F z w q b b + + - = ' ) 1 (    (7) 
 
The wage obtained is a weighted average of the alternative wage and a term noted [ ] t N x F q + '  
which includes the marginal productivity of labor and the mean hiring cost of a vacant job per 
unemployed. We can justify the presence of this latter term in the wage equation since, if the 
bargaining is successful, the firm saves some hiring costs. This creates a rent which can be 
shared between the firm and the worker.  
 
Finally, for a given bargaining power of the worker, a lower tightness on the labor market 
(lower q ) increases the probability to fill a vacancy and diminishes the expected cost to fill it. 
This hence results in a lower wage rate. 
 
 
2.  Two models of bargaining  
 
Having set the general framework, we then focus on two bargaining games depending on the 
sequence of decisions between investment and wage. The models will be analysed along these 
two frameworks.  
 
  Perfect capital market 
 
Let suppose that there is a perfect capital market so that a firm cannot be stuck with capital it 
cannot use. We then posit that it can always rent it on a second hand capital market without 
sunk cost. This can be modelled as if bargaining and firm decisions were taken independently. 
 
The bargaining takes place between the firm and the worker as described before, where the 
cost of a vacant job is depicted as  t t x g = . This represents all the costs a firm incurs to fill its 
vacant job which we described as cost of advertising, of screening candidates and so on. In a 
long term perspective, these hiring costs are bound to increase so as the alternative wage 
workers  perceive  when  unemployed.  Along  the  lines  of  Bean  and  Pissarides  (1993),  we 
therefore suppose that they evolve according to the capital per capita. Let write  t t bk z =  and 
t o t k g g =  to be on a steady state growth path: 
[ ] t N t t k F bk w
t 0 ' ) 1 ( g q b b + + - =    (8) 
  
Turning  to  the  firm’s  dynamic  problem  (4),  we  write  a  Hamiltonian  to  find  the  critical 
conditions for the supply of jobs and capital : 
 
( ) t t t t t t t t t N V q I V N w kN K F H l q h m g - + + - - = ) ( ) , (    7
where m  and h represent respectively the marginal values of capital and labor. In steady state 

























    (9) 
 
As usual in a case of investment externality, marginal productivity of capital is constant and 
equal to  a A . Marginal productivity of labor is equal to the wage rate plus an additional term 
representing the actualised mean hiring cost of a vacant job which depends on the tightness of 
the labor market. Indeed, more vacancies with respect to unemployment result in a lower 
probability for the firm to fill its vacancy and then to a higher expected cost. 
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b    (10) 
Simplifying equation (11) with respect to  t k  and replacing the interest rate by its value : 
( ) ( ) 0
) (
) (
1 ) 1 ( 0 =
+ +
- - - - g
q




b A    (11) 
 
This job creation equation (labelled JC hereafter) can be solved for the tightness on the labor 
market and depicts the labor market functioning. Expressed in a  ) , ( v u  diagram, this gives an 
upward line with slope q . A higher tightness on the labor market increases the expected cost 
of a vacant job which decreases the opportunity for firms to offer vacant jobs. This tend tends 
to increase the unemployment rate. 
 





 - = t t t N V q N l q) (
.
 can be expressed in steady state so as 
to depict the equilibrium unemployment rate. Noting that identical firms all have the same 
tightness  parameter  and  that  labor  is  supplied  inelastically,  we  write  L u V q =   and  
L u N ) 1 ( - =  which can be reexpressed as  L u L u q ) 1 ( ) ( - = l q q . Solving for u  gives the well-
known Beveridge relation (noted UV). 





=    (12) 
 
By properties of the matching technology, this equation appears as a decreasing and convex 
curve  in  a  vacancy-unemployment  space  (Figure  1).  More  vacancies  result  in  a  higher 
probability for worker to find a job and hence to a lower unemployment rate. 
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Fig. 1. Labor market equilibrium 
 
Job creation condition and the Beveridge curve determine equilibrium unemployment and 
vacancies. All conditions modifying labor market functioning such as the alternative wage 
perceived by unemployed or bargaining power of the worker will move either the curves (JC) 
or (UV). It will then affect the tightness equilibrium of the labor market. 
 
In summary, the basic equations of the model appear as follows:  
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A  dichotomy  appears  between  the  labor  market  functioning  and  the  growth  process.  The 
interest rate is determined by the marginal productivity of capital, constant in such a model of 
endogenous  growth.  The  incentive  to  report  consumption  is  therefore  also  kept  constant 
which guarantees a continuous growth process.  
 
  Investment irreversibility 
 
We  move  away  from  the  perfect  capital  market  to  consider  a  sequential  model  in  which 
investment decisions of firms occur before bargaining takes place. This can be justified on 
several grounds, being that investment is irreversible (Grout 1984, Grossman and Hart 1986) 
or that bargaining can be reconsidered once investment has taken place (non biding contract). 
We do not consider that firms have the opportunity to hire capital on a second-hand market. 
v 
u 
  JC 
 
θ  UV   9
In these two cases, decisions in the model are taken sequentially, investment taking place in a 
first step while the wage is bargained in a second step. 
 
Applying backward induction to solve this sequential game, the representative firm decides 
on the capital stock to install integrating the bargaining result. Let then consider first the 
bargaining game in this configuration. 
 
Bargaining in a case of investment irreversibility 
Whatever the source of the sequential decisions, firms may have capital unemployed in a case 
of bargaining failure. This cost of unemployed capital has to be taken into account in the 
bargaining game.  
 
In a case of bargaining failure, a firm who wanted to hire remains with a vacant job. This 
incurs costs for the firm made of cost of capital and cost of filling this vacancy. This then 
writes : t t t rk x + =g . 
 
The wage equation resulting from the Nash bargaining process  [ ] t N t t x F z w q b b + + - = ' ) 1 (  
 is :  
[ ] t t N t t k r F z w q g q b b + + + - = ' ) 1 (   (13) 
As before, the wage bargained is a weighted average of the  alternative wage and a term 
composed of the marginal productivity of labor and the mean hiring cost per worker. An 
additional term  t k r q  appears which stands for the mean capital lost per unemployed. For a 
given tightness and bargaining power of the worker, a higher investment results in a higher 
wage bargained as the worker extracts a higher part of the quasi rent of investment. We can 
finally note that this rent-seeking effect will be higher, the higher the bargaining power of the 
worker and the lower the unemployment rate.   
 
Investment decision 
Due to the sequential process, firms decide on investment before bargaining occurs. This is 
solved  by  backward  induction  taking  account  of  the  bargaining  result.  Firm’s  dynamic 
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   (14) 
Writing  a  Hamiltonian  and  solving  this  as  before,  we  obtain  the  following  steady-state 
equilibrium conditions:  N w F r K K ' ' - = . In equilibrium, the return of an additional unit of 
capital is equal to its cost. As before, the return is made of the marginal productivity of capital 
but this is now diminished by a term showing the influence of capital on the wage bargained. 
Hence, firms explicitly take into account the effect of its decision on the wage bargained. 
N
r
F w NK K
q
b b + = ' ' '   (15)   10
In the wage equation, capital exerts an influence on the marginal productivity of labor so as a 
term representing the rent-seeking behaviour of the worker. The two terms are positive and 
support the idea that a higher capital stock leads to a higher wage bargained.  
 
Using the production function expression, we then obtain as equilibrium conditions: 








r    (16) 
 
Let us first return to the capital equilibrium condition. In a sequential framework, the return of 
capital is diminished as workers appropriate a part of the quasi-rent of capital. For given labor 
market conditions, a higher bargaining power of the worker increases the rent-seeking effect 
and hence reduces the return of capital ( 0 ' < b r ).  
 
Besides this fact, labor  market conditions also play on this rent-seeking behaviour of the 
worker.  This  effect  increases  with  the  tightness  on  the  labor  market  ( 0 ' < q r ).  A  lower 
unemployment  means  that  workers  extract  a  higher  part  of  the  capital  installed.  On  the 
opposite, a higher unemployment rate reduces this kind of effect. This then relates conditions 
on the labor market and return of capital and offer and interesting link between the two. 
 
Employment decision 
As in the perfect capital market case, first order conditions for the employment decision of 
firms appear as follows: 
0
) (







t Nt   (17) 
Making use of the particular wage equations in investment irreversibility (14) and simplifying 
with respect to  t k , we then obtain:  
( ) ( ) 0
) (
) (
1 ) 1 ( 0 =
+ +






r b A    (18) 
In  this  framework,  labor  market  conditions  do  not  solve  independently  of  the  rest  of  the 
model.  The  following  system  determines  jointly  interest  rate  and  tightness  on  the  labor 
market: 
( ) [ ]
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In a case of sequential decision, the dichotomy obtained before is no longer valid. When 
investment decision intervenes before bargaining occurs, the return of investment and the job 
creation equation are jointly determined.  
 
These  two  conditions  can  be  depicted  in  a  ) , ( r q   diagram.  Let  denote  (KC)  the  capital 
equilibrium curve and (JC2) the job creation curve in a case of investment irreversibility. 
These two curves are downward sloping in a  ) , ( r q  diagram. More precisely, a higher interest 
rate results in a higher sunk cost of capital and a higher wage bargained for the worker. This 
decreases the profitability to offer a vacancy for firms and lead to a lower tightness on the 
labor market. On the investment side, a higher tightness on the labor market which means that 
there are more vacant jobs with respect to unemployment, implies that the rent-seeking effect   11
of  the  worker  is  greater  and  hence  the  interest  rate  lower.  Once  again,  this  results  in  a 
downward relation between tightness and interest rate. 
 
The model is therefore depicted by the following equations: 
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The  dichotomy  depicted  in  the  preceding  game  no  longer  appears.  A  system  determines 
jointly equilibrium interest rate and tightness. These being solved, the return on capital allows 
to obtain the growth rate of the economy, this being higher, the higher the investment return. 
On the other hand, tightness on the labor market determines the equilibrium unemployment 
rate along the traditional Beveridge curve. 
 
 
3.  Growth in two bargaining games 
 
Whereas in the first game a dichotomy appeared between labor market condition and return of 
capital, a link is established in case of sequential bargaining. After comparing the growth rate 
obtained, the influence of the bargaining power of worker on the labor market variables and 
the growth process will then be considered along these two lines.  
 
  Comparing growth rates 
 
Investment irreversibility will impact the growth process and clearly depicts a lower growth 
rate: 





















This means that the rate of growth in case of investment irreversibility can be durably altered 
by the rent-seeking behaviour of the worker. By affecting the return of capital, workers play 
on  the  incentive  to  report  consumption  and  hence  on  the  growth  rate.  The  structure  of 
investment or of the employment contract may play a role. 
 
  Bargaining power of the worker and growth  
 
In these two games, the influence of the bargaining power of worker also widely differs. In a 
perfect capital market, a higher bargaining power of the worker would move the job curve 
(Figure 2) to the right. As the wage increases due to the higher bargaining power of the 
worker, it is less profitable to offer vacancies in this framework. This then leads to a higher 
unemployment rate and a lower number of vacant jobs. In this game, the higher bargaining 
power only impacts labor market performance.   12
 
 
Fig. 2. The impact of an increased bargaining power on the labor market 
 
In a case of investment irreversibility, a higher bargaining power for the worker will both 
affect  employment  and  investment  decisions  as  they  both  play  on  the  capital  equilibrium 
curve (KC) and the job creation curve in a case of investment irreversibility (JC2). In this 
framework, what is the impact of a higher bargaining power of the worker ? 
 
A higher bargaining power for the worker results in a lower tightness at a given interest rate. 
More bargaining power will increase the wage bargained and then decrease the opportunity to 
offer new vacancies. This then result in a move of the job creation curve (JC2) to the left in 
Figure 3. On the other hand, a higher bargaining power will also result in a lower interest rate 
as  the  rent-seeking  effect  of  the  worker  might  be  increased.  This  moves  the  capital 
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Fig. 3. Labor market and return of capital in a case of investment irreversibility 
 
The result of this higher bargaining power is bound to lead to a lower tightness on the labor 
market but might be ambiguous on the interest rate.  
·  A higher bargaining power for the worker decreases the capital return as the rent-
seeking effect is reinforced 
·  At  the  same  time,  this  higher  bargaining  power  diminishes  tightness  on  the  labor 
market. This then tends to limit the appropriation effect which itself tends to increase 
capital return. 
 
In a case of sequential decisions, the worker tries to extract the quasi-rent of capital. This 
effect is higher, the higher the bargaining power of the worker and the tightness on the labor 




4.  Conclusion 
 
Economic  performances  depend  on  the  bargaining  structure.  Two  structures  were 
considered in this paper differentiated by the sequence of investment and wage decisions. In a 
perfect capital market  case,  growth is being determined separately  from the labor market 
conditions and does not depend on the bargaining power of worker. An investment decision 
determined before bargaining occurs induces an integrate functioning of the model. First the 
growth rate obtained is lower than the one obtained without sequential decisions. Investment 
structure or bargaining structures therefore matter on the long run economic performance of 
an economy. We also show that the bargaining power of the worker does not exhibit a clear-
cut effect on growth.  
 
r 
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